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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN K. CROWLEY, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
: Case No. 2006-0712 CA 
CHRIS BLACK, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Plaintiff/Appellant John Crowley, by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, 
submits the following REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT: 
ISSUES PRESENTED & PRESERVED 
Appellee Black's claim that attorney fees and pre-judgment interest were not 
prayed for or presented below is not accurate.1 The trial court heard plaintiffs request for 
attorney fees at the close of trial. Transcript, 106:19-23. The trial court heard and 
considered plaintiffs motion for new trial which included plaintiffs' request for attorney 
fees. Record 90-91. The trial court heard and considered plaintiffs request for 
pre-judgment interest in reviewing the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
1
 The Complaint recites parties' written lease and a provision regarding attorney 
fees. Record 1-5, Complaint, fflf 4-6. The complaint recites that plaintiff has incurred 
attorney fees. Record 1-5, Complaint f 14. Finally, the amount prayed for includes an 
estimated amount for attorney fees. Record 1-5, Complaint, Prayer, p. 3. 
and defendant's objection thereto. Record 110-111; 116; 128-129. 
The trial court did not deny plaintiffs request for attorney fees because they were 
not prayed for in the Complaint. See Record 90-92; 128-129. Similarly, the trial court 
did not deny plaintiffs request for pre-judgment interest because it was not prayed for in 
the Complaint. See Record 110-111; 128-129. 
The issues on appeal were presented to and considered by the trial court and 
properly preserved for this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
John Crowley sued Chris Black seeking damages for breach of a written rental 
agreement. Crowley sought $5,538.00 in the Complaint. After a bench trial, the Hon. 
Glenn Iwasaki Judge awarded Crowley $4,679.26 in damages. 
The written rental agreement provided that Crowley as the prevailing party in a 
lawsuit against his former tenant Black would be awarded attorney fees. The trial court 
orally ruled there was no prevailing party. The trial court refused to award attorney fees 
to Crowley. The trial court made insufficient findings to justify the denial of an award of 
attorney fees. 
Crowley was the successful party to the litigation; he was awarded the bulk of 
damages sought in his complaint. Crowley was the prevailing party and the trial court 
erred in not awarding attorney fees to Crowley. 
The damages suffered by Crowley as a result of Black's misconduct were specific 
2 
and easily calculated with certainty as to when they were incurred. Crowley sought and 
was entitled to prejudgment interest. The trial court refused to award prejudgment 
interest to Crowley. The trial court made insufficient findings to justify the denial of 
prejudgment interest. 
Because damages were incurred in a certain amount and on certain dates, plaintiff 
was entitled to and should have been awarded prejudgment interest. The trial court erred 
in not awarding prejudgment interest. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS 
LEGAL ERROR BECAUSE LOSSES INCURRED ARE PRECISE SUMS 
FIXED AT A DEFINITE TIME. 
The law in Utah on this issue is clear: 
Where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a 
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest 
should be allowed from that time . . . and not from the date of judgment. 
On the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated 
with mathematical accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, 
wrongful death, defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the 
amount of the damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the 
fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed. 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989) (quoting First Sec. Bank 
of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc.. 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982)); see also Bellon v. 
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991). The foregoing was recently confirmed by this 
3 
Court in Bennett v. Huish. _ P.3d _ , 2007 UT App. 19, fflf 42 et seq. (Ut. Ct. App. 2007). 
The amount of damages incurred by Crowley are in sums certain and because they 
originated at a definite time, interest "can be calculated with mathematical accuracy." 
Coalville City v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The trial court 
determined that upon moving out in November 2001, Black had caused damage, beyond 
normal wear and tear, in the amount of $ 4,679.26. The court determined this amount 
after trial where plaintiff Crowley presented the court with receipts, invoices and 
testimony indicating that plaintiff had expended money repairing the residence damaged 
by Black. Exhibits "P-4" - "P-8." 
In Bennett v. Huish, _ P.3d _ , 2007 UT App. 19 (Ut. Ct. App. 2007), plaintiff 
sought $27,955.98 in his complaint but was awarded only $18,643.98 after trial. Id, f 42. 
That disparity did not result in plaintiff being denied pre-judgment interest. Id., f^ 45. 
Crowley's loss is definite and fixed as to both amount ($4,679.26) and time 
(November 2001). These two facts allow for the calculation of prejudgment interest 
"with mathematical accuracy." See City of Coalville, supra. As such, the court below 
committed legal error in denying plaintiffs request for prejudgment interest. 
The trial court's denial of prejudgment interest is accorded no deference and will 
be reviewed for correctness. Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App. 5, % 23, 994 P.2d 817. On 
appeal a denial of prejudgment interest is reviewed for correctness as a question of law. 
Bennett v. Huish. _ P.3d _ , 2007 UT App. 19, fflf 42 et seq. (Ut. Ct. App. 2007)("A trial 
4 
court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law which 
we review for correctness." quoting Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f^ 16, 82 
P.3d 1064 (quotations and citation omitted)). 
Here, the trial court heard and considered plaintiffs request for prejudgment 
interest in reviewing the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and defendant's 
objections thereto. Record at 116. A claim for prejudgment interest is a statutory claim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1953 as amended). In appropriate cases, such interest is 
awarded as a matter of law. Id. 
Plaintiff Crowley produced evidence and exhibits2 at trial which proved: (1) the 
existence of damages in certain dollar amounts which were attributed to defendant's 
breach of the lease agreements3; and (2) the breaches of the lease agreements occurred on 
a fixed date.4 The trial resulted in damages fixed at an amount certain ($4,679.26) and a 
fixed date (December 2001) of plaintiff s losses. Thus, the criteria for an award of 
2
 The Exhibits introduced at trial included receipts for work performed to repair 
the damages caused by defendant. Exhibits "P-4" - "P-8." Those Exhibits provide the 
exact date and the exact amount of money paid for each repair. Id. 
3
 See Conclusions of Law f 3 ("Defendant breached the lease agreement..."); 
See also Conclusions of Law U 10 ( "Plaintiff should be awarded . . . total money 
damages of $4,679.26) (emphasis added). 
4
 See Findings of Fact fflf 7-12 ("Defendant terminated the lease and vacated the 
premises in December 2001.* * * During the term of the lease, extensive damage 
occurred to the home and premises, beyond normal wear and tear. That was a breach of 
the lease ^ {emphasis added). 
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prejudgment interest were met and plaintiff was entitled to such interest award as a 
matter of law. See Coalville, supra at 1212. 
A legal claim for prejudgment interest need not be specifically plead and proved at 
trial by a plaintiff.5 Black cites no authority to support such a claim. 
The trial court erred in denial of plaintiff s prejudgment interest claim. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED ATTORNEY FEES TO 
PLAINTIFF DESPITE DEFENDANT'S CONTRACTUAL BREACH. 
Whether a party is the prevailing party is a question for the trial court, and depends 
in large measure on the context of each case. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 
1119, 1126-27 (Utah 2002). Therefore, "it is appropriate to leave this determination to 
the sound discretion of the trial court." Id. Considerations for the trial court include, but 
are not limited to, 
(1) contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, 
etc., brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other 
and their significance in the context of the lawsuit as a whole, and (4) the dollar 
amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims. 
Id. In the case at bar, the trial court's analysis failed to adequately address the R.T. 
Nielson Co. factors and failed to make the necessary findings; its determination that 
neither party prevailed falls outside the controlling law. 
5
 In similar fashion, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (d) and (e) provide for award 
of court costs and/^ast-judgment interest and recite no condition that a complaint 
specifically plead for such relief. 
6 
The court below summarily denied plaintiff Crowley's request for attorney's fees 
based solely on its determination that the damages actually awarded to plaintiff 
($4,679.26) fell short of the damages requested ($5,538.00), there was no prevailing 
party. This oral observation by the trial court comprises the entirety of its prevailing party 
analysis. The failure of the trial court to make any findings make appellate review 
difficult, if not impossible. See Cabrera v. Cottrcll 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
l9S5)(stating "an award [or denial] of attorneys fees must generally be made on the basis 
of findings of fact supported by evidence and appropriate conclusions of law."). 
The award of attorney fees and the determination of which litigant is the prevailing 
party for purposes of awarding such fees are decisions left to the discretion of the trial 
court. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. CooL 40 P.3d 1119, 1126-27 (Utah 2002). However, in 
exercising the discretionary authority to award or deny attorney fees, the court's decision 
must be supported by adequate findings of fact and appropriate conclusions of law. See 
Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis Inc. v. Davis County Comm'n. 121 P.3d 39, 41 
(Utah Ct. App. 2005). In denying plaintiffs request for attorney fees, the Court below 
failed to support its decision with the requisite findings and failed to adhere to the 
analytical frameworks approved by the appellate courts for determining which party 
prevailed. 
The mere fact that plaintiff was not awarded every dollar prayed for is not 
sufficient for the trial court to determine that plaintiff was not the prevailing party. 
7 
Utahns for Better Dental supra. The trial court's oral discussion is devoid of any legal 
authority for the proposition that attorney fees must be denied when a litigant's recovery 
is less than originally prayed for. See Tr. Transcr. 106: 1-25. The controlling authority 
requires more analysis in a prevailing party determination. See, e.g., R.T. Nielson Co. v. 
Cook, 40 P.3d 1119, 1126-27 (Utah 2002); see also Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. 
Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The trial court's sparse analysis orally expressed at close of trial is inadequate 
under either R.T. Nielson or Mountain States Broadcasting.6 Appellee fails to cite legal 
authority to show that the trial court had any basis for or properly supported its exercise of 
discretion.7 
6
 The Court's prevailing party/attorney fees analysis is limited to: 
Based upon this analysis, the Court finds that while you may have prevailed 
on certain aspects of it, you certainly did not prevail to the total amount that 
you're asking for. The court finds that under these particular circum-
stances, there is no prevailing party. As such, no attorney's fees will be 
granted. 
Tr. Transcr. 106: 19-23. 
7
 The few cases cited by defendant/appellee deal not with the sufficiency of a 
court's prevailing party/ attorney fees analysis but, rather, with the calculation of an 
amount for attorney fees. Appellee's Brief at 10. These cases are not helpful nor 
pertinent to the case at bar in which there was no calculation as to an amount of 
attorney's fees. The trial court never progressed to a point where fee amounts were 
considered. There was a total denial of attorney fees with little or no explanation from 
the court as to which facts or law supported such a conclusion. This lack of articulated, 
reasoned analysis runs afoul of principles announced in Utahns for Better Dental R.T. 
Nielson, and Mountain States, supra. Defendant/appellee's cited cases do not vitiate this 
abuse of discretion. 
8 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The trial court provided little explanation in its oral ruling as to the factual or legal 
reason for the denial of an award of attorney fees. The trial court entered inadequate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding attorney fees. 
Plaintiff was the prevailing party because a judgment for past due rent, lost rent 
and for damages to the rental property was awarded to plaintiff at trial. 
Based upon the written lease, as the prevailing party, plaintiff is entitled to and 
should have been awarded attorney fees and out of pocket expenses incurred in the 
successful pursuit of this action. 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
In this landlord and tenant dispute, Plaintiff was awarded special damages for 
unpaid rent, for lost rent, and for damage caused to plaintiffs rental property during 
defendant's occupancy. All those damages are in amounts certain established by 
evidence or receipts showing payment made by plaintiff in 2001 and early 2002. 
With clear and specific factual information, plaintiffs special damages as set by 
the Court below were measured by "facts and figures" or "calculated with mathematical 
accuracy." Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to 
prejudgment interest. 
9 
This Court should rule that plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and prejudgment 
interest. This matter should be remanded to the trial Court with a determination that 
plaintiff Crowley is the prevailing party and is entitled to an award of attorney fees and is 
entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest. Plaintiff should be granted his costs and 
attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
DATED this 15th day of MARCH 2007. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
10 
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